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" S E N S O R Y , S E N S O R I U M commune, the seat of the common sense, 
or that part of place where the sensible soul is supposed more imme-
diately to reside. The sensory is supposed to be that part of the brain 
wherein the nerves, from all the organs of sense, terminate; which 
is generally allowed to be about the beginning of the medulla 
oblongata: Descartes will have it in the conarion or pineal gland." 
— Chambers' Cyclopaedia ( 1 7 2 8 ) 1 
V / N H I S J O U R N E Y through the Bourbonnais after his emo-
tional encounter with the deranged peasant girl, Mar i a , Yorick 
indulges in an apostrophe that may be taken as the crux of any 
interpretation of Laurence Sterne's A Sentimental Journey: 
—-Dear sensibility! source inexhausted of all that's precious in 
our joys, or costly in our sorrows! thou chainest thy martyr down 
upon his bead of straw — and 'tis thou who lifts him up to 
H E A V E N — eternal fountain of our feelings!-—'tis here I trace 
thee — and this is thy divinity which stirs within me — not, that 
in some sad and sickening moments, "my soul shrinks back upon 
herself, and startles at destruction" — mere pomp of words! — 
but that I feel some generous joys and generous cares beyond my-
self— all comes from thee, great — great S E N S O R I U M of the 
world! which vibrates, if a hair of our heads but falls upon the 
ground, in the remotest desert of thy creation.2 
From previous commentaries four basic views toward this apos-
trophe have emerged : ( 1 ) that it is Yorick's, not Sterne's, infatu-
ation with a God who vibrates emotionally at the slightest event; 
( 2 ) that it is distrustful as well as celebratory toward Yorick 's / 
Sterne's sensibility; (3) that the inflated language implies a 
disembodied ascent for the moment only to be collapsed in the 
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final episode, "The Case of Delicacy"; and ( 4 ) that it is an 
exalted expression of feeling coming from within the individual 
but inextricably joined to the cosmic system.3 Without denying 
the ambivalent tone of the narrative, which accounts for these 
diverse responses, I wish to demonstrate why the last view may 
be primary to the author's intention. 
Short of declaring Sterne's text simply indeterminate and 
hence either to be rejected or indulged as "unreliable" narrative, 
we need to examine it further in the light of the eighteenth-
century mind /body dilemma. In Arthur Cash's view, the most 
likely context for this apostrophe is the controversy between 
Leibniz and Clarke over Newton's explanation in the Opticks of 
space as God's sensorium.4 Against Leibniz's objection that God 
would therefore require sense organs and not be pure spirit, 
Clarke replied that Newton had intended the opposite meaning 
of the soul as a living, immaterial substance being present to the 
things themselves. According to Cash, Sterne is rendering Yorick 
as a caricature of the sensationalist that Leibniz accused Newton 
of being: "The infatuated Yorick is not to be taken as the 
spokesman for the philosophy of Laurence Sterne." 5 
A recent essay avoids this rigid bifurcation between author 
and character by emphasizing the blend of irony and feeling in 
the tone: "The element in this passage that survives the satire is 
the direct link Yorick makes between sense and sentiment, his 
recognition of the human ability to endow objective phenomena 
with personal meaning." 0 A subsequent statement, however, 
reverses the order of priority in the experience: " A hair falling 
on the remotest desert is evidence of 'generous joys and generous 
cares beyond myself.' " Although elsewhere amply endowing 
objective phenomena with private intentionality, here for once 
Yorick is finally testifying that his individual feelings are not self-
rooted but inherently sympathetic with the Other like the "great 
S E N S O R I U M " of the godhead that is present to all phenomena. 
Unfortunately, instead of developing his important insight con-
cerning the link between sense and sentiment, Chadwick takes 
cues from Mayoux and Braudy to justify the text's supposed 
indeterminacy as an outlet for the higher freedom of rich sub-
jectivity and inventiveness in the reader. 
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Another recent essay shows the very different problem of over-
determinacy by attempting to find a source for Sterne's associa-
tionism in David Hartley's theory of vibrations. 7 Happily, the 
tenuous juxtaposition of a radical determinism with Sterne's 
joyous physiology does prompt Lamb to concede at one point: 
"Although this account would not look out of place in Martinus 
Scriblerus' system of muscular morality, and although we might 
expect Sterne to see it as ridiculous as Swift and Arbuthnot saw 
similar mechanistic theories, it seems to be the case that Sterne 
finds an intelligible account of human behavior in a doctrine like 
Hartley's." 8 Aside from the lack of any evidence that Sterne ever 
read Hartley, not only the Cartesian mechanism but the lack-
lustre, quasi-scientific style of the Observations on Man would be 
anathema to Shandeism. Sterne, for instance, uses repeatedly the 
vibration theory of the nerves commonplace among Newton's 
followers to describe sensations, and he especially makes the feel-
ings equivalent to musical sound. Thus while Tristram "felt the 
kindliest harmony vibrating within me, with every oscillation of 
the chaise alike" and all his perceptions "touch'd upon some 
secret spring either of sentiment or rapture," the moment is ripe 
for "the sweetest notes I ever heard" of Maria 's vespers ( I X . 
x x i v . 4 8 3 ) . Yorick's paternalistic sentiments, in turn, "touch'd 
upon the string on which hung all her sorrows — she look'd with 
wistful disorder for some time in my face; and then, without 
saying any thing, took her pipe, and play'd her service to the 
Vi rg in —• The string I had touch'd ceased to vibrate — in a 
moment or two M a r i a returned to herself — let her pipe fall — 
and rose up" (pp. 2 7 3 - 7 4 ) . In a jocular letter to Mrs . Vesey, 
probably written in 1761 , Sterne loses control with the musical 
figure to express his erotic delight : 
But that You are sensible, and gentle and tender — & from [one] 
end to the other of you full of the sweetest tones & modulations, 
requires a Connoisseur of more taste & feeling — in honest truth 
You are a System of harmonic Vibrations — You are the sweetest 
and best tuned of all Instruments — O Lord! I would give away 
my other Cassoc to touch you — but in giving this last rag of 
my Priesthood for this pleasure You perceive I should be left 
naked — <nay> if not quite dis-Orderd: — so divine a hand as 
y r e would presently get me into Order<s> again —• but if Yo[u] 
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suppose, this would leave me, as You found me — believe me 
dear Lady, You are mistaken.9 
Clearly, Sterne as a writer found in contemporary physiology a 
creative resource not only for satiric reductionism as in Swift but 
also for celebrating the human spirit as, for example, in George 
Cheyne's medico-theology : 
That the Intelligent Principle, or Soul, resides somewhere in the 
Brain, where all the Nerves, or Instruments of Sensation termi-
nate, like a Musician in a finely fram'd and well-tun'd Organ-
Case; that these Nerves are like Keys, which, being struck on or 
touch'd, convey the Sound and Harmony to this sentient Prin-
ciple, or Musician.10 
By contrast to Cheyne and Sterne, however, Hartley is unequivo-
cal toward the musical analogy: "For that the Nerves themselves 
should vibrate like musical Strings, is highly absurd; nor was it 
ever asserted by Sir Isaac Newton, or any of those who have 
embraced his Notion of the Performance of Sensation and 
Motion, by means of Vibrat ions." 1 1 
T o understand the exuberant physicality in A Sentimental 
Journey we need to recognize the important shift from mechan-
ism to materialism in eighteenth-century natural philosophy. The 
climate of scientific opinion changed significantly, for instance, 
between 1717, when the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence was 
published, and 1768, when Sterne wrote Yorick's narrative 
shortly before his death. As Robert Schofield has shown, the 
original impetus from the Principia and the Opticks in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was to explain all 
natural phenomena in terms of primary particles related by 
attraction and repulsion, and predictable in their motions by the 
Calculus. By the 1740 's, however, in conjunction with other sub-
jective tendencies in the culture — Richardson's novels, the re-
flective poems of Gray, Young, Collins, and Cowper, the Wes-
leyan evangelical movement, the solipsism of Berkeley and Hume 
— a new generation of natural philosophers began seeking the 
causes of phenomena in unique substances having qualities in 
proportion to their quantity. Though often used interchangeably, 
"mechanism" and "materialism" denote for Schofield these two 
distinctly different tendencies, the latter, non-mathematical and 
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anti-Newtonian in spirit, though attributing to the vague aether 
hypothesis in the Opticks a source for the new iatric interest in 
physiology and chemistry. 1 2 
Sterne's place in the mid-century intellectual revolution may 
best be seen in his consistent attack on the traditional mind / 
body dualism, whether in classical philosophy, medieval theology, 
or in Cartesian mechanism. What Yorick rejects in quoting the 
"mere pomp of words" from Addison's Cato is apparently 
Plato's argument in the Phaedo that the rational soul welcomes 
death as a release from the prison of the body. 1 3 Since this 
dualism applies equally to the Pauline/Augustinian doctrines of 
the world, flesh, and devil, Sterne's unorthodox use of current 
physiology to interpret the story of Job in a sermon is not only 
against Stoics like Seneca or Epictetus : " — one is led to doubt, 
whether the greatest part of their heroes, the most renowned for 
constancy, were not much more indebted to good nerves and 
spirits, or the natural happy frame of their tempers, for behav-
ing well, than to any extraordinary helps, which they could be 
supposed to receive from their instructors." 1 4 As in the sermons, 
Tristram constantly reminds us of the close interdependence of 
mind and body: " A Man's body and his mind, with the utmost 
reverence to both I speak it, are exactly like a jerkin, and a 
jerkin's l ining; — rumple the one — you rumple the other" 
( I I I . iv . 120) . If the conditions of this middle state are often 
laughable, however, so are the pretenders to a rationalistic idea: 
I love the Pythagoreans (much more than ever I dare tell my 
dear Jenny) for the i r . . . "getting out of the body, in order to 
think well." No man thinks right whilst he is in it; blinded, as 
he must be, with his congenial humours, and drawn differently 
aside, as the bishop and myself have been, with too lax or too 
tense a fibre—Reason is, half of it, Sense; and the measure of 
heaven itself is but the measure of our present appetites and 
concoctions—• (VII.xiii .376) 
Whatever the context of dualism, whether in Platonism, Stoi-
cism, Pythagoreanism, Cartesianism, or the new Methodism, 
Sterne remains contemptuous of any scheme to place mind firmly 
over the body. Implicit in his assault on the old dualistic meta-
physics is a temporizing of orthodox theology with the enlight-
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ened humanism greatly influenced by the experimental philoso-
phy. In this light we may trust his statement about his last work : 
"my Sentimental Journey wi l l , I dare say, convince you that my 
feelings are from the heart, and that that heart is not of the 
worst of molds — praised be God for my sensibility!" 1 5 
If Sterne is fairly consistent in opposing the traditional hier-
archy of mind over body and of reason over the passions, his 
attitude toward the rival claims of mechanism and materialism, 
on the one hand, and of vitalism, on the other, is more complex. 
During the initial scene at Calais, after reaching a benevolistic 
high, aided of course by the wine, Yorick declares with apparent 
contradiction in view of his circumstances: " In doing this, I felt 
every vessel in my frame dilate — the arteries beat all , chearily 
together, and every power which sustained life, performed it with 
so little friction, that 'twould have confounded the most physical 
précieuse in France: with all her materialism, she could scarce 
have called me a machine-—" (pp. 6 8 - 6 9 ) . Why his awareness 
of dilated blood vessels and good feelings should prove that he is 
more than a machine is not immediately clear, but his automatic 
dismissal of the begging monk immediately afterwards leaves no 
doubt that his behaviour can be mechanical at times, as he often 
acknowledges after the fact. Yet the interesting thing is that 
Yorick, like many of his informed contemporaries, may indeed 
be curious, if not neurotically driven, to find out whether there 
is a ghost in the machine. His scene with M a r i a is qualitatively 
different from his solitary performance at Calais: despite the 
mechanical motions with the handkerchief to wipe away Maria 's 
tears as well as his own, this time he genuinely feels sympathy; 
and the erotic impulse reinforces rather than undermines the 
interaction : 
as I did it, I felt such indescribable emotions within me, as I am 
sure could not be accounted for from any combinations of matter 
and motion. 
I am positive I have a soul; nor can all the books with which 
materialists have pester'd the world ever convince me of the 
contrary, (p. 271) 
Unless we assume that Sterne is merely ridiculing sentimentalism 
by emphasizing its dependence on the bodily processes, an im-
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probable intention if only because Yorick is his own best critic 
on other occasions, then the claim here to spirituality, it seems to 
me, hits at the older kinematic mechanics promulgated by the 
Cartesians in favour of the mid-century tendency toward vital-
ism, which stressed a purposive "sentient principle" in the cor-
poreal system. 
If Yorick's fear of being no more than a machine, therefore, 
alludes to L a Mettrie's L'Homme machine ( 1 7 4 7 ) , as some 
scholars have believed, it is doubtful whether Sterne knew the 
book itself for despite its monistic denial of the soul or mind, it is 
surprisingly Shandean in tone and equally against the outmoded 
matter-and-motion kinematics. As A r a m Vartanian points out: 
To understand the special filiation of mood and idea in that work 
[L'Homme machine], we must first recall that at the time what 
was really felt to be deadening was the metaphysics of dualism, 
which, with the theology it supported, had ossified into a series of 
platitudes. By contrast, materialism came as a quickening and 
liberating current. Because it was possible to see in matter a 
source of spontaneous energy, the man-machine became associ-
ated in the moral sphere, somewhat paradoxically, with attitudes 
of freedom from restraint and joie de vivre™ 
Unlike Descartes' bête machine, which Leibniz and others at the 
time felt was absurd because it excluded consciousness, L a 
Mettrie's homme machine incorporates Leibniz's idea of force 
motrice, the self-moving power of the organism. Taking a long 
neglected principle from Francis Glisson, who in the 1670 's 
objected to the Cartesian clock analogy by pointing out the 
inherent movement in all the parts of the animal body, both L a 
Mettrie and Haller advanced the conception of irritability on 
the findings of recent experiments with muscle tissue. Another 
important discovery of the 1740 's, Trembley's polyp, with its 
astonishing ability to generate new zoophytes after being severed, 
complemented the principle of irritability: "The cosmic machine 
resembles the organism in that its moving and directing principle 
is to be found inside, not outside, its own structure." 1 7 Ironically, 
a physical précieuse in L a Mettrie's camp could very well have 
called Yorick a machine and not at all be confounded by his 
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vigorous emotionalism, which on the contrary reveals the very 
force of living matter from within. 
But if L a Mettrie's machine hyhpothesis was a brilliant at-
tempt to bridge the extremes of vitalism and mechanism, more 
conservative contemporaries like Jerome Gaub and Robert Whytt 
had a similar interest and may have been more familiar to 
Sterne. Gaub's obj'ective was to apply physiological knowledge to 
the treatment of major mental disorders; trained by Boerhaave 
and also a professor of medicine at Leyden, he delivered his 
academic oration, De regimine mentis quod medicorum est in 
1747, with L a Mettrie in the audience. 1 8 Although Gaub pru-
dently maintained a respectable mind/body dualism, his demon-
stration of the profound interaction between physical and mental 
states was neither far from the homme machine nor from Tris-
tram's rumpled jerkin and its lining. Drawing upon Galen's and 
Hippocrates' psychosomatic doctrines to counter the Platonic 
incorporeal psyché, Gaub cautiously admits that "the power of 
the mind over the body is probably no greater than that of the 
body over the mind . " 1 9 But what would have been most disturb-
ing in the era of Locke and Newton is Gaub's theme that the 
irrational, often unconscious and involuntary phenomena of 
emotions and unknown bodily processes predominate in the sys-
tem for good or i l l . In both mind and body he finds an agent of 
arousal, the enormôn, a term borrowed from Hippocrates, quite 
beyond the control of the rational faculties: "When it slumbers 
you might think it absent entirely, so little does it then do; when 
it is aroused it breaks forth with a most violent impulse hardly 
to be contained." He calls the corporeal enormôn the "neural 
man" : "this structure of nerves is no less animated from within 
by its motive power than it itself stirs up the rest of the body's 
inert mass throughout which it extends. In this sense it repre-
sents a kind of man within a man." 2 0 
M u c h more polemically dictrinal than Gaub, Robert Whytt, 
professor of medicine at Edinburgh, also steered safely between 
vitalism and mechanism while showing the supreme importance 
of the nerves in the living organism. He criticizes Georg Stahl 
specifically for "extending the influence of the soul, as a rational 
agent, over the body a great deal too far"; and he dismisses the 
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Cartesians for reducing all phenomena to mechanical principles. 
T o refine his position further, he declaims against the "modern 
Materialists [who] have imagined the anima to be no other than 
a more subtile kind of matter lodged chiefly, in the brain and 
nerves, and circulating with the grosser fluids" and against "a 
few authors [who] have run even such lengths, as to suppose the 
very animus, or rational soul itself, material." 2 1 Nevertheless, if 
disturbed by the materialists, Whytt is quick to deny the scho-
lastic opinion that the soul exists in an individual point and 
argues from physiological evidence that it "must be present at 
one and the same time, if not in all the parts of the body, yet, 
at least, where-ever the nerves have their origin; i.e., it must be, 
at least, diffused along a great part of the brain and spinal 
marrow." T o support this psychosomatic thesis Whytt points out 
that "some of the greatest Philosophers of the last and present 
age, supposed the soul to be extended," naming Gassendi, Henry 
More, Isaac Newton, and Samuel Clarke. 2 2 Having established 
his orthodoxy in the tradition of the Anglican Church and the 
Royal Society, Whytt then describes the involuntary motions of 
the nerves as primary and of the blood as secondary, the "sensi-
bility" or irritability of the heart deriving from the sensorium 
commune and all the feelings excited in the mind and nerves. 
W i t h some diffidence in admitting the determinism of the in-
voluntary motions in the body, he compensates by stressing the 
idea of "a general sympathy which prevails through the whole 
system" and the remarkable "consent between various parts of 
the body" to allay any fears of either old or new machine hypo-
theses.23 
Surely nothing in Gaub, Whytt, or even in much of L a Mettrie 
conflicts with Sterne's celebration of life as corporeal motion 
directed by some instinctive power in the organism. A n y argu-
ment to prove a rationalistic theology as a norm in Sterne's 
sermons wil l need to skip deftly over the abundant concern with 
the involuntary and unconscious or hidden dynamics of vibra-
tions and fluids that not only mitigate the individual's moral 
accountability but on the positive side ally h im to the whole 
system of nature : 
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in the present state we are in, we find such a strong sympathy and 
union between our souls and bodies, that the one cannot be 
touched or sensibly affected, without producing some correspond-
ing emotion in the other, — Nature has assigned a different look, 
tone of voice, and gesture, peculiar to every passion and affection 
we are subject to; and, therefore, to argue against this strict cor-
respondence which is held between our souls and bodies, — is 
disputing against the frame and mechanism of human nature. — 
We are not angels, but men cloathed with bodies, and, in some 
measure, governed by our imaginations, that we have need of all 
diese external helps which nature has made the interpreters of 
our thoughts. 
Tristram plays on the psychosomatic dilemma in the same lan-
guage: "nor are we angels, I wish we were, — but men cloathed 
with bodies, and governed by our imaginations" ( V . v i i . 2 7 3 ) ; 
and doubtless because of our corporeal state, we are damned to 
syllogizing by our noses while angels and spirits do it by intui-
t ion. 2 4 
Like his contemporaries in physiology, Sterne understands the 
irrational element in man to exert an all-important function of 
survival. If the imagination, clothed with the body, thwarts our 
analytic ability, its illusory power, corresponding with the pur-
posive motions of the body, is indispensable. In his sermon 
"Trust in G o d , " rather than the usual emphasis from orthodox 
rationalism on the freedom to believe or not to believe, Sterne 
seems to identify religious faith with some unknown involuntary 
process of nature : 
though in fact it no way alters the nature of the cross accidents to 
which we lay open, or does at all pervert the course of them, — 
yet [it] imposes upon the sense of them, and like a secret spring 
in a well-contrived machine, though it cannot prevent, at least it 
counterbalances the pressure, — and so bears up this tottering, 
tender frame under many a violent shock and hard justling, 
which otherwise would unavoidably overwhelm it. — Without 
such an inward resource, from an inclination, which is natural to 
man, to trust and hope for redress in the most deplorable condi-
tions, — his state in this life would be, of all creatures, the most 
miserable.25 
Just as Gaub prefers to avoid naming the "certain something 
both in the body and in the mind" to underscore its mysterious 
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presence and just as Whytt repeatedly acknowledges his per-
plexity at how the mind affects the body, so Sterne adopts the 
indefinite pronoun for the heuristic idea of this "inward resource" 
to prolong life against all odds. 
But in Tristram Shandy, however, when again the idea recurs 
with much of the same language, the discourse between Walter 
and Toby implies ironically the hobby-horsical penchant for 
naming things unknown as a self-gratifying means of knowing: 
Though man is of all others the most curious vehicle, said my 
father, yet at the same time 'tis of so slight a frame and so totter-
ingly put together, that the sudden jerks and hard josdings it 
unavoidably meets with in this rugged journey, would overset and 
tear it to pieces a dozen times a day — was it not, brother Toby, 
that there is a secret spring within us — Which spring, said my 
uncle Toby, I take to be Re l ig ion . . . . Figuratively speaking, dear 
Toby, it may, for aught I know, said my father; but the spring 
I am speaking of, is that great and elastic power within us of 
counterbalancing evil, which like a secret spring in a well-ordered 
machine, though it can't prevent the shock — at least it imposes 
upon our sense of it. 
While Walter charitably indulges his brother's figurative term 
for this "secret spring" as "Religion," as a natural philosopher, 
of course, he believes that his own mechanistic nomenclature 
("elastic power") brings him closer to the thing itself ( I V . i i i . 
2 0 9 ) . 2 6 
In A Sentimental Journey Yorick's task of affirming that he 
has a soul while in the country of the lumières is no easier than 
Sterne's of finding the right situation and language for it. A 
major strategy, however, after showing repeated failures to get 
beyond the mechanical behaviour conditioned by situation, is to 
suggest that "settled principle of humanity and goodness" of 
purposive emotion against the many delusions, freely admitted by 
the narrator, of a permissive imagination. Unfortunately, as a 
writer in a highly charged atmosphere of curiosity about the 
body processes and their identity in the cosmic system, Sterne, 
for all of his apparent inventiveness, is still conventional enough 
to predicate Yorick's vibration and pulse of the moment as an 
epiphany of oneness with the godhead without knowing how to 
extend it further than an analogy between nervous sympathy 
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and divine omniscience. Readers in the mode of a Coleridge or 
a Thackeray may continue to suspect almost everything in the 
narrative tone; but in the context of mid-eighteenth-century dis-
course on the body, with the dualistic metaphysics nearly dis-
credited, we discover a material world richly potential and self-
sufficient, with a divinity merely "present" like the cipher 
strangely participating in the wondrous processes of the body. 2 7 
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